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In the 1970s, work hours in Europe were similar to work hours in America, but today 
Europeans work less than Americans. Prescott (2004) attributes the decline in 
European work hours to an increase in the effective marginal tax rate on labour 
income. The Australian labour market experience confirms that the taxation of labour 
income is an important determinant of the decision to work. In Australia taxes and 
work hours did not change much in the long-run, but Australian work hours 
rebounded after a temporary increase in taxes in the 1980s. The resilience of 
Australian work hours suggests that a return to the tax rates of the 1970s would 




 11. Introduction 
 
As recently as in the 1970s, work hours in Europe exceeded work hours in 
America, yet today Europeans spend less time at work than Americans. The reversal 
of European and American work hours in the last quarter of the 20
th century provides 
an opportunity to study the effect of labour market institutions on national labour 
supplies. Institutional factors that are commonly thought to influence the decision to 
work include the tax system, unemployment benefits, the degree of unionisation and 
other labour market institutions.   
Table 1 illustrates the dramatic shift that occurred in weekly work hours in 
Europe and America. In the early 1970s, work hours per person aged 15 to 65 years 
averaged 24.4 hours in France and 24.6 hours in Germany, whereas Americans 
worked 23.5 hours. By the mid-1990s, average work hours had fallen to 17.5 hours in 
France and 19.3 hours in Germany, whereas American work hours had risen to 25.9 
hours. This amounts to a decrease in labour supply of 28 percent in France and 22 
percent in Germany, and an increase of 10 percent in America. Between the 1970s 
and the 1990s, weekly work hours fell in all G-7 countries, except in America and 
Canada.  
Prescott (2004) developed a labour market model that highlights the relationship 
between weekly work hours and taxes on labour income. He concludes that “virtually 
all of the large differences between the U.S. labour supply and those of Germany and 
France are due to the differences in the tax system.” Surprisingly, national differences 
in labour market institutions, including the system of unemployment benefits and the 
degree of unionisation, matter little. The distortionary effect of the high European 
taxes on labour income produces a substantial welfare loss. Prescott (2004) estimates 
 2that if France were to reduce its taxes on labour income to the U.S. level, the welfare 
of French workers as measured by lifetime consumption equivalents would increase 
by 19 percent. 
 
Table 1. Work Hours per Week for the G-7 Countries 
 
Country  1970-74 1993-96 
 
Canada   22.2  22.9 
France   24.4  17.5 
Germany   24.6  19.3 
Italy   19.2  16.5 
Japan   29.8  27.0 







Note: Weekly work hours per person aged 15 to 65 
years. Source: Prescott (2004). 
 
 
Davis and Henrekson (2005) conduct a cross country analysis of the effect of 
taxes on work effort. They concur with Prescott “that tax rate differences among rich 
countries explain much of the international variation in work activity outcomes.” Still, 
the findings of Prescott (2004) and Davis and Henrekson (2005) remain controversial. 
Olovsson (2004) shows that work hours in Sweden exceed work hours in France and 
Germany, although Sweden has the highest tax rate in the world. Nickell (2004) 
reckons that unemployment accounts for about half of the difference in labour supply 
between Europe and the United States. Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) consider 
the effect of the tax system, unemployment benefits, employment protection, the 
system of wage determination and barriers to labour mobility on unemployment. 
 
 3Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2006) also reject Prescott’s claim that taxes 
explain most of the low work hours in Europe. They argue that a regression of work 
hours on taxes that omits the degree of unionisation overestimates the effect of taxes 
because tax rates are positively correlated with the degree of unionisation. Once the 
degree of unionisation and employment protection is included among the explanatory 
variables, the tax effect becomes insignificant. Rogerson (2006), however, finds no 
relationship between work hours and the degree of unionisation and employment 
protection. He also points out that country and time dummy variables account for 
most of the explanatory power in the regressions conducted by Alesina, Glaeser and 
Sacerdote (2006). 
 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) hold that generous government transfers, which 
are conditional on recipients not working, account for low European work hours. 
Prescott (2007) rejects their model because, unlike his own, it does not provide “a 
quantitative general equilibrium analysis ….. that is restricted to be consistent with 
the national account statistics.” Yet, Prescott recognises that Ljungqvist and Sargent’s 
approach sheds light on the implications of labour indivisibility. Employed Europeans 
work similar hours per day and week as Americans. In Europe average weekly work 
hours of the working age population are low because people take longer vacations, 
more sick days and there are more public holidays. In addition, Europeans start to 
work later in life and they retire earlier than Americans.  
In this paper, the quantitative general equilibrium model of Prescott (2004) is 
used to analyse the relationship between taxes on labour income and work hours in 
Australia. Section II presents Prescott’s labour market model. Section III details how 
Australian national accounts data were transformed to fit the labour market model and 
 4how the effective marginal tax rate on labour income was calculated. Section IV 
compares actual and predicted work hours in Australia with work hours in the G-7 
countries. As in the United States, in Australia taxes on labour income and work hours 
did not change much in the long-run, but a short-lived increase in Australian taxes 
temporarily reduced work hours in the 1980s. Section V considers whether other 
factors besides labour taxes affected work hours. Section VI concludes with some 
remarks on taxation and labour supply in Australia.   
 
2. Labour Market Model 
 
Prescott (2004) developed a labour market model that explains how a person 
allocates time between work and leisure. The distinction between work and leisure 
depends upon whether an activity is taxed or not. Market work is subject to taxation, 
whereas leisure comprises all tax-free non-market work, in particular home work and 
work in the shadow economy, together with ordinary leisure activities. The available 
time for work and leisure is 100 hours per week, the remaining time being used for 
sleep and other necessities of life. In period t, the preferences of the representative 
worker are: 
log log(100 ) t c t h α +−         ( 1 )  
c is consumption, h represents weekly work hours, and (100-h) measures leisure 
time. The parameter α is a weight that determines the subjective value of leisure. The 
worker allocates time between market work and leisure subject to the budget 
constraint: 
 
 5(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ct xt h t t k t t t t cxw h r k k T τ ττ τ δ δ ++ += − + − − + +  (2) 
x denotes gross investment, w the real wage, k the capital stock and δ the 
depreciation rate. The taxes are: τc consumption tax rate, τx investment tax rate, τh 
marginal labour tax rate and τk capital income tax rate. The budget equation states that 
the sum of wage income, capital income, depreciation allowances and government 
transfers Tt must equal expenses for consumption and gross investment, with all items 
being adjusted by the pertinent tax rate. The government uses taxes to finance public 
services, which, except for military expenses, are assumed to be perfect substitutes for 
private consumption. Any excess of taxes over expenses for public services is 
returned to households as lump-sum transfer payments. 
Output yt is produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
1
tt t t y Ak h
θ θ − =          ( 3 )  
Assuming workers are paid the marginal product, the parameter θ is the capital 
share in income. At is a productivity parameter. Since the Cobb-Douglas production 
function has constant returns to scale, the size of the productive unit does not matter; 
it may be a single worker or a firm.  
The effective marginal tax rate on labour income captures the combined effect of 
labour and consumption taxes on the work decision. Differentiating the budget 














        ( 4 )  
 6In this expression the fraction (1 )/(1 ) hc τ τ − +  represents the effective marginal 
increase in labour income, unencumbered by labour and consumption taxes. Setting 










         ( 5 )  
The first optimum condition requires that the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure is equal to the after-tax real wage, using the 














=−         ( 6 )  
The marginal rate of substitution, which is shown on the left-hand side of the 
optimum condition, can be derived from equation 1. The second optimum condition 
states that the real wage must equal the marginal product of labour.  
(1 ) / t wy t t h θ =−         ( 7 )  
Substituting equation 7 into equation 6 yields the key equilibrium relationship 
between work hours, the effective marginal tax rate on labour income and the 


















        ( 8 )  
This equilibrium relationship contains two endogenous variables, work hours h 
and the consumption-income ratio c/y, whose values depend on the effective marginal 
tax rate τ and all other factors that determine the path of the economy in a dynamic 
 7macroeconomic model. The equation splits the effect of a change in the tax rate into a 
present-time substitution effect and an intertemporal substitution effect. An increase 
in  τ lowers the incentive to work because the after-tax wage falls, reducing the 
relative price of leisure in the first optimum condition. If the increase in τ  is expected 
to be temporary, the c/y ratio rises because people work less and, maintaining con-
sumption, save less as long as the higher taxes persist. Consequently, a temporary 
increase in τ reduces h because (1-τ) falls and the intertemporal substitution effect 
increases the c/y ratio. A permanent tax increase cannot be avoided by postponing 
work effort. As there is no intertemporal substitution effect, a permanent tax increase 
reduces  h only by lowering (1-τ), without affecting the c/y ratio. Since extra tax 
revenues are returned to households through lump-sum transfer payments, there are 
no wealth effects in this analysis. Prescott (2004) uses equation 8 to measure the 
effect of taxes on work hours.  
 
3. Australian Taxes 
Prescott (2004) calculates the effective marginal tax rate on labour income for the 
G-7 countries, using United Nations System of National Accounts data (SNA). The 
following calculations for Australia follow Prescott’s method as far as possible.
1 
Since SNA data are unavailable for Australia after 1998, OECD data have been used 
for the period from 2001 to 2003.  
 
                                                 
1 The Appendix to the electronic version of this paper includes spreadsheets with the 
Australian data and calculations.    
 8Most indirect taxes are consumption taxes, although some indirect taxes are 
levied on investment goods, for example in the transport sector and in the building 
industry. Prescott assumes that in the G-7 countries two thirds of total indirect taxes 
net of subsidies are consumption taxes, and the other third falls evenly on con-
sumption and investment goods. Then, net indirect consumption taxes are: 




⎡ =+ ⎢ + ⎣⎦
I T ⎤
⎥        ( 9 )  
IT and ITc denote total indirect taxes and indirect consumption taxes net of 
subsidies, and C and I are consumption and investment from the national accounts. 
Capital letters indicate national accounts data. 
Indirect taxes are computed on final products in the budget equation because they 
are assigned to households in the model. Therefore, indirect taxes must be removed as 
a cost component of GDP and consumption. The model variables for aggregate output 
y and consumption c are:  
IT GDP y − =          ( 1 0 )  
c military IT G G C c − − + =        ( 1 1 )  
(G–Gmilitary) stands for the government’s civilian public services. Aggregate con-
sumption is composed of private consumption and civilian public services, which are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes.  






= τ          ( 1 2 )  
 9The model considers two taxes rates associated with labour income, the marginal 








       ( 1 3 )  
Social security taxes include contributions for pension funds, unemployment 
insurance, health insurance and a number of other provisions. (1–θ) is the labour share 
of income in the Cobb-Douglas production function if workers earn the marginal 
product in a competitive labour market. 





      ( 1 4 )  
The average income tax rate is transformed into the marginal tax rate by the formula 
inc ss h τ τ τ 6 . 1 + =          ( 1 5 )  
The average tax rate is multiplied by the factor 1.6 because the marginal tax rate 
exceeds the average tax rate in a progressive income tax system. Prescott (2004) 
derives the figure from a study by Feenberg and Coutts (1993), who use a sample of 
U.S. tax records to determine the marginal tax rate on labour income. The effective 
marginal tax rate on labour income τ  (equation 5) combines the consumption tax rate   
c τ  (equation 12) with the marginal income tax rate  h τ  (equation 15). 
The effective marginal tax rate on labour income is low in Australia compared to 
most G-7 nations (Table 2). In the 1970s and 1990s, taxes in Australia absorbed close 
to one third of an extra dollar of labour income. In the G-7 countries, marginal tax 
 10rates between 40 and 50 percent were common in the 1970s, and above 50 percent in 
the 1990s. The only exception is Japan with a marginal tax rate of 25 percent in the 
1970s and 37 percent in the 1990s. The effective taxation of labour income is less 
onerous in Australia than abroad because both the marginal labour tax rate and 
indirect consumption taxes are low. Australians did not pay a general consumption tax 
until the introduction of the goods and services tax (GST), which became operational 
on July 1, 2000. Even after the introduction of the GST, the effective marginal tax rate 
remained low because the GST, which is set at 10 percent, replaced a host of indirect 
taxes, and basic food items as well as some other goods and services are exempted.  
 
Table 2. Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Australia  
and the G-7 Countries 
 
Country 1970-74  1993-96 
 
Australia 0.32  0.34 
Canada 0.44  0.52 
France 0.49  0.59 
Germany 0.52  0.59 
Italy 0.41  0.64 
Japan 0.25  0.37 







Source: G-7 countries (Prescott 2004), Australia 




Table 2 documents the increase in taxes in continental European countries from 
the early 1970s to the early 1990s. The effective marginal tax rate on labour income 
rose from 49 percent to 59 percent in France and from 52 percent to 59 percent in 
Germany. Meanwhile, tax rates remained virtually unchanged in Australia and the 
United States. This substantial increase in the tax wedge forms the basis of Prescott’s 
 11explanation of the labour supply divide that has occurred between America and 
Europe since the 1970s. The American labour supply remained stable because the tax 
rate did not change, whereas in Europe rising taxes provided a disincentive for work. 
As will be seen in the next section, the Australian labour market experience was 
similar to that of the United States. 
 
4. Actual and Predicted Work Hours  
 
In this section equation 8 is used to predict work hours for Australia during the 
past four decades. The predicted work hours are compared with actual values, which 
are calculated from labour market data of the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre and the OECD Database on labour force statistics. The capital share parameter 
θ = 0.3224 and the leisure parameter α = 1.54 are the same as in Prescott (2004). The 
value of θ is the average for the G-7 countries, and the value of α brings the predicted 
work hours near the actual value for most G-7 countries in Prescott’s study. If 
Prescott’s hypothesis on the importance of taxes in determining labour supply is 
correct, then Australian work hours should be similar to those in other countries with 
comparable tax rates, the predicted number of work hours should match actual work 
hours, and actual and predicted work hours should move in the opposite direction of 
the tax rate from one period to the next.  
In the early 1970s, actual work hours were similar in Australia, America, France 
and Germany. In all four countries, 15 to 65 year olds on average worked about 24 
hours per week (Tables 1 and 3). From the 1970s to the 1990s, tax rates and actual 
work hours remained stable in Australia and the United States, while taxes increased 
 12and work hours fell below twenty hours in France and Germany (Tables 1, 2 and 3). 
This observation supports Prescott’s hypothesis that the tax rate determines work 
hours. Between the 1970s and 1990s, work hours remained stable in Australia and the 
United States where taxes did not change, while the increase in European taxes 
accounts for the decline in European work hours. But the model fails to explain work 
hours in the 1970s. Actual work hours were similar in Australia, America, France and 
Germany, although the effective marginal tax rate on labour income was considerably 
less in the first two countries. 
 
              Table 3. Actual and Predicted Labour Supply for Australia 






















1986-88  0.39 0.72 27.0 22.9  4.1 
1993-96  0.34 0.76 27.6 23.5  4.1 
2001-03  0.33 0.74 28.6 24.0  4.6 
 
 
In Table 3 predicted Australian work hours exceed actual work hours by about 4 
to 6 hours. Prescott (2004) provides a somewhat better fit between predicted and 
actual work hours for the G-7 countries, with an average absolute error of 4.1 hours in 
the 1970s and 1.6 hours in the 1990s. One explanation for the divergence between 
predicted and actual work hours in Australia is that actual work hours may be too low. 
Since OECD data are unavailable until 1978, Australian work hours were calculated 
using data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. After 1978, actual 
work hours increase between 0.7 and one hour if OECD data is used instead of the 
 13Groningen data. Prescott (2004) also suggests that the model overpredicts work hours 
for countries with a low tax rate because the curvature of the logarithmic utility 
function with respect to leisure may be too low. Since the Australian tax rate was low, 
a more strongly curved utility function would reduce predicted work hours.  
In Table 3 predicted and actual work hours always move in the same direction, 
reflecting changes in the Australian tax rate. Between the early 1970s and the late 
1980s, the Australian tax rate increased from 32 percent to 39 percent, leading to a 
decline in predicted work hours from 30.3 to 27.0 hours and in actual work hours 
from 24.2 to 22.9 hours. Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the movement in 
the tax rate reversed and work hours rebounded. The tax rate dropped to 34 percent in 
the early 1990s and stayed at that level afterwards. The lower tax rate accounted for 
an increase in predicted work hours from 27.0 to 28.6 hours and in actual work hours 
from 22.9 to 24.0 hours. After high taxes in the 1980s, the tax rate returned to a level 
that was only one percentage point higher than thirty years earlier, and actual work 
hours differed by only 0.2 hours from the previous level. Thus, the Australian 
experience supports Prescott’s policy recommendation that if France and Germany 
reversed the increase in their tax rates since the 1970s, then they would move toward 
their previous labour supply outcomes. In Australia the reversal of the tax rate after a 
period of high taxes indeed restored the original labour supply.   
 
5. The Consumption-Income Ratio 
Of course, the taxation of labour income is not the only factor that determines 
labour supply. Equation 8 contains two endogenous variables, work hours h and the 
consumption-income ratio c/y, which depend on the effective marginal tax rate on 
 14labour income τ and on all other factors that are relevant in a dynamic macro-
economic model. These other factors include the current capital stock, expected future 
tax rates and productivity shocks. It is possible that movements in these other factors 
cause simultaneous changes in work hours and the c/y ratio, without a change in the 
marginal tax rate. For example, a temporary increase in the marginal product of labour 
provides an incentive to work more and to save, raising work hours and reducing the 
c/y ratio. Ljungqvist (2006) shows that the tax rate explains about two thirds of the 
change in work hours in France and Germany between the 1970s and 1990s, the 
remaining third being accounted for by productivity shocks and other factors that 
affect the c/y ratio.  
Ljungqvist (2006) measures the effect of a change in the effective marginal tax 
rate on work hours by holding the c/y ratio constant in equation 8. This yields the 
effect of a permanent tax change on work hours that does not produce an inter-
temporal substitution effect, providing the minimum effect of a tax change on work 
hours. Table 4 compares the predicted work hours for Australia, using the actual c/y 
ratio in each period and holding the c/y ratio constant at the level of the preceding 
period; the c/y ratio is given in Table 3. Between the 1970s and 1980s, predicted work 
hours fell by 10.9 percent, but they would have fallen by 7.3 percent if the c/y ratio 
had been constant. Thus, the increase in the tax rate from 32 percent to 39 percent 
accounted for two thirds of the reduction in labour supply, and maybe more if people 
perceived the tax hike to be temporary, as it indeed turned out to be. Between the 
1980s and 1990s, predicted work hours increased by 2.0 percent, but they would have 
increased by 5.9 percent if the c/y ratio had been constant. In this interval, an increase 
in the c/y ratio dampened the positive effect of the fall in the tax rate on work hours. 
Between the 1990s and the early 2000s, the tax rate accounted for one third of the 
 15increase in predicted work hours. In the last interval, the effect of the tax rate was 
modest because it did not change much. These calculations confirm that the 
Australian labour supply responds strongly to changes in the effective marginal tax 
rate on labour income.   
 




Hours  % Change 
1970-74 30.3   
1986-88 (86-88 c/y ratio)  27.0             -10.9 
1986-88 (70-74 c/y ratio)  28.1  -7.3 
 
1986-88 27.0   
1993-96 (93-96 c/y ratio)  27.6  2.0 
1993-96 (86-88 c/y ratio)  28.6  5.9 
 
1993-96 27.6   
2001-03 (01-03 c/y ratio)  28.6  3.6 




The taxation of labour income has a decisive influence on labour supply in the  
G-7 countries and Australia. Thirty years ago, average work hours were similar in 
Australia, America and continental Europe. Prescott (2004) attributes the subsequent 
decline in European work hours to an increase in the effective marginal tax rate on 
labour income. The Australian labour market experience fits the pattern observed 
among the G-7 countries. As in America, Australian taxes and work hours did not 
change much in the long-run, but a short-lived increase in taxes temporarily reduced 
 16work hours in the 1980s. The resilience of the Australian labour supply suggests that 
Prescott is right that a return to the tax rates of the 1970s would restore the European 
labour supply. 
Remarkably, the same values for the leisure parameter α and the capital share 
parameter  θ yield a reasonable fit between predicted and actual work hours for 
Australia and all G-7 countries. It seems that idiosyncratic differences among 
households average out at the aggregate level, both nationally and internationally. For 
this reason, the same representative household can be used to model aggregate labour 
supply in Australia and the G-7 countries. Even so, choosing slightly different 
parameter values for each country would improve the model fit. In particular, the 
progression of income taxes almost certainly differs across countries. Therefore, using 
distinct values for the Feenberg-Coutts parameter would improve the model fit at the 
national level.   
This model can be used to ascertain the sensitivity of the labour supply to 
changes in the effective marginal tax rate on labour income. In Australia, an increase 
in the tax rate from 32 percent to 39 percent reduced predicted work hours by 10.9 
percent between the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, work hours fell by 1.6 percent for a one 
percentage point increase in the tax rate. The increase in European taxes had a 
somewhat stronger effect on work hours. Using Prescott’s figures, predicted work 
hours fell by 2.3 percent in France and by 3.0 percent in Germany for every one 
percentage point increase in the tax rate between the 1970s and 1990s. This informa-
tion is useful in a tax reform that affects the effective marginal tax on labour income, 
either by changing the marginal labour tax rate or the consumption tax rate (GST). 
Using 2001-03 figures, a revenue neutral increase in the GST from 10 percent to 12 
 17percent would increase the effective marginal tax rate by 1.1 percentage points, 
reducing Australian work hours by 1.2 percent. If Australia adopted the German con-
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